Rare Earth

STRATEGIC STUDY OF THE BRAZILIAN RARE EARTH MARKET

Resources, Mining, Processing, Separation, Advanced Materials, Regulation, Investment, and Opportunities for International Companies.

• Study Date: August 2026

• Version: 1.0

• Published by: Trust Brazil — Investment and Business Opportunity Page

• Language: American English

• Classification: Institutional Investment & Market Intelligence Report

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Why Brazil?

Brazil holds the second-largest rare earth reserves in the world, estimated at approximately 21 million tonnes of REO (USGS, 2025). These reserves are distributed across ionic clay deposits, monazite, and carbonatites. The country's territorial scale, clean energy matrix (84% renewable), consolidated port infrastructure, and strategic geographic position — with Atlantic access and proximity to the United States and Europe — position Brazil as a first-tier geological asset.

In addition, Brazil has growing domestic demand. The country imports approximately 10,000 tonnes per year of permanent magnets (CGEE/MCTI, 2025), consumed mainly by electric motors, compressors, generators, and electromechanical systems. Brazil's energy transition — with expansion of offshore wind, vehicle electrification, and industrial modernization — will accelerate this demand significantly.

Why Now?

The global rare earth market is undergoing structural reorganization. China controls approximately 60% of world mining, 85% of refining, and 90% of permanent magnet production (USGS, 2025; Mordor Intelligence, 2026). In 2025, China imposed export controls on seven medium and heavy rare earth elements (Sm, Gd, Tb, Dy, Lu, Sc, Y) and later expanded to five more, creating a price bifurcation between the Chinese market and the ex-China market. NdPr oxide, which traded at USD 55/kg in 2024, reached an average of USD 69/kg in 2025 and converged to USD 110–113/kg by July 2026, driven by the U.S. Department of Defense price floor (USD 110/kg) and Chinese restrictions.

This concentration has created strategic vulnerability. Countries and companies are actively seeking new sources of mining and, especially, new processing and separation hubs outside China. Brazil emerges in this context as one of the few jurisdictions with relevant geological resources, an evolving favorable institutional environment, and explicit government policy to industrialize the value chain.

Where Is the Opportunity?

Brazil's strategic opportunity is not limited to mining. The country already has one commercial operational project (Serra Verde, Goias) and multiple projects in advanced development. The real gap — and therefore the largest investment opportunity — lies in the stages of processing, chemical separation, refining, oxide production, metals, alloys, and permanent magnets.

Brazil has zero commercial capacity to separate individual rare earth elements. It does not produce separated oxides at industrial scale. It does not commercially produce rare earth metals. It does not produce alloys at scale. And it imports practically 100% of the permanent magnets it consumes.

This gap is recognized by the Brazilian government, which in 2025 launched a joint BNDES-Finep Public Call of BRL 5 billion (with potential to leverage BRL 45.8 billion in investments) for strategic minerals, including rare earths, with explicit focus on "intermediate and final transformed products with value-added aggregation." The National Rare Earth Strategy (ENTR), under development by the Ministry of Mines and Energy with support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and CEBRI, sets ambitious targets: 20% of global rare earth production and 40,000 tonnes per year of separation capacity.

Central Thesis: Brazil's investment opportunity is not merely extracting rare earths from the ground. It is building the intermediate and downstream value chain that transforms ore into oxides, metals, alloys, and magnets — capturing higher margins and serving global demand for diversified supply chains outside China.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. WHAT ARE RARE EARTHS

2. THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN

3. GLOBAL MARKET

4. GEOPOLITICS AND MINERAL SECURITY

5. BRAZIL — GEOLOGICAL POTENTIAL

6. MAIN BRAZILIAN PROJECTS

7. PLAYER MAP — COMPETITIVE MAPPING

8. SPECIAL FOCUS — PROCESSING: BRAZIL'S CRITICAL BOTTLENECK

9. GAP ANALYSIS OF THE BRAZILIAN CHAIN

10. INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES CONSIDERING BRAZIL

11. PROCESSING — OPPORTUNITIES FOR INVESTORS

12. BRAZILIAN APPLICABLE LEGISLATION

13. CRITICAL MINERALS POLICY

14. PROJECT ECONOMICS

15. LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

16. BRAZILIAN DEMAND

17. EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

18. BRAZIL'S COMPETITIVENESS

19. RISKS

20. SWOT ANALYSIS

21. SCENARIOS 2030–2035

22. VISION 2050

23. ENTRY MODELS FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES

24. PRIORITY OPPORTUNITIES

25. INVESTMENT THESIS — WHY BRAZIL RARE EARTHS?

26. WHO SHOULD LOOK AT BRAZIL?

27. HOW TO ENTER BRAZIL — PRACTICAL ROADMAP

28. TRUST BRAZIL — ROLE AND OPPORTUNITY

29. CONCLUSION

30. FINAL OPPORTUNITY MAP — BRAZIL RARE EARTH OPPORTUNITY MAP

31. SOURCES AND REFERENCES

1. WHAT ARE RARE EARTHS

1.1 Definition and Classification

Rare Earth Elements (REE) are a group of 17 chemical elements in the f-block of the periodic table, composed of the 15 lanthanides plus scandium (Sc) and yttrium (Y). Despite the name, most elements are not particularly rare in terms of crustal abundance. The "rarity" refers to the difficulty of finding them in economically viable concentrations and, primarily, the complexity of separating them chemically from one another.

1.2 The 17 Elements

The 17 rare earth elements and their key characteristics are as follows:

• Scandium (Sc): Used in aerospace aluminum alloys and welding. Strategic relevance: Medium.

• Yttrium (Y): Heavy rare earth element (HREE). Used in LED phosphors, lasers, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and superconductors. Strategic relevance: High.

• Lanthanum (La): Light rare earth element (LREE). Used in NiMH batteries, catalysts, and specialty glass. Strategic relevance: Medium.

• Cerium (Ce): LREE. Used in automotive catalysts, glass polishing, and batteries. Strategic relevance: Medium.

• Praseodymium (Pr): LREE. Used in NdFeB permanent magnets and magnesium alloys. Strategic relevance: Very High.

• Neodymium (Nd): LREE. Used in NdFeB permanent magnets for electric vehicle motors and wind turbines. Strategic relevance: Very High.

• Promethium (Pm): LREE. Used in nuclear batteries and luminescence. Strategic relevance: Low (radioactive).

• Samarium (Sm): LREE. Used in SmCo magnets for aerospace and defense, and nuclear reactors. Strategic relevance: High.

• Europium (Eu): LREE. Used in LED phosphors, plasma screens, and nuclear reactors. Strategic relevance: High.

• Gadolinium (Gd): HREE. Used in MRI, nuclear reactors, and magnets. Strategic relevance: High.

• Terbium (Tb): HREE. Used in high-temperature magnets for EVs and wind turbines, and lighting. Strategic relevance: Very High.

• Dysprosium (Dy): HREE. Used in high-temperature magnets for EVs and wind turbines, and nuclear reactors. Strategic relevance: Very High.

• Holmium (Ho): HREE. Used in lasers, medical magnets, and nuclear reactors. Strategic relevance: Medium.

• Erbium (Er): HREE. Used in fiber optic amplifiers and lasers. Strategic relevance: Medium.

• Thulium (Tm): HREE. Used in medical lasers and X-ray equipment. Strategic relevance: Low.

• Ytterbium (Yb): HREE. Used in lasers, MRI, and memory devices. Strategic relevance: Low.

• Lutetium (Lu): HREE. Used in oil detection and MRI. Strategic relevance: Medium.

1.3 Light vs. Heavy Rare Earth Elements (LREE vs. HREE)

Light Rare Earth Elements (LREE) include Lanthanum, Cerium, Praseodymium, Neodymium, Samarium, and Europium. They are more abundant and have lower unit value. Neodymium and Praseodymium are the most critical due to demand for NdFeB magnets.

Heavy Rare Earth Elements (HREE) include Gadolinium, Terbium, Dysprosium, Holmium, Erbium, Thulium, Ytterbium, Lutetium, and Yttrium. They are less abundant and have much higher unit value. Dysprosium and Terbium are essential for high-performance magnets in EV motors and wind turbines.

1.4 Elements of Greatest Strategic Relevance

Neodymium (Nd) and Praseodymium (Pr) are responsible for approximately 90% of the value of rare earth magnets (True Source Metals, 2026). Each electric vehicle consumes an average of 2 kg of NdFeB magnets; electric trucks consume up to 8 kg. Direct-drive offshore wind turbines consume 600 to 1,200 kg of NdFeB per MW.

Dysprosium (Dy) and Terbium (Tb) are added to NdFeB magnets to increase resistance to demagnetization at high temperatures. EV traction motors operate at 180 degrees Celsius. Dysprosium trades at approximately USD 452 per kg and Terbium at USD 1,720 per kg (USGS MCS 2026; Argus Media). China controls nearly 100% of HREE separation capacity.

2. THE GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN

2.1 Chain Stages

The complete rare earth value chain flows as follows: Exploration, then Mining, then Beneficiation, then Concentration, then Separation, then Oxides, then Metals, then Alloys, then Magnets, then Components, and finally End Products.

2.2 Analysis by Stage

Exploration uses geophysics, drilling, and mapping. CAPEX is low. Complexity is low. Know-how requirement is medium. Barriers to entry are low. Margin potential is none (pre-revenue). Environmental risks are low.

Mining uses open pit, underground, and in-situ leaching. CAPEX is medium to high. Complexity is medium. Know-how requirement is medium. Barriers to entry are medium. Margin potential is 15% to 25%. Environmental risks are high, including tailings and water management.

Beneficiation uses crushing, grinding, flotation, and magnetic separation. CAPEX is medium. Complexity is medium. Know-how requirement is medium. Barriers to entry are medium. Margin potential is 10% to 20%. Environmental risks are medium.

Concentration uses acid leaching and precipitation. CAPEX is medium to high. Complexity is high. Know-how requirement is high. Barriers to entry are high. Margin potential is 20% to 30%. Environmental risks are high, including chemicals and radioactivity.

Separation uses solvent extraction (SX) and ion exchange. CAPEX is high. Complexity is very high. Know-how requirement is very high. Barriers to entry are very high. Margin potential is 25% to 40%. Environmental risks are high, including organic solvents.

Oxides production uses calcination and purification. CAPEX is medium. Complexity is high. Know-how requirement is high. Barriers to entry are high. Margin potential is 20% to 35%. Environmental risks are medium.

Metals production uses electrolytic reduction and thermal reduction. CAPEX is high. Complexity is very high. Know-how requirement is very high. Barriers to entry are very high. Margin potential is 15% to 25%. Environmental risks are medium.

Alloys production uses induction and vacuum melting. CAPEX is medium. Complexity is high. Know-how requirement is high. Barriers to entry are high. Margin potential is 15% to 25%. Environmental risks are low.

Magnets (NdFeB) production uses sintering, hydrogen decrepitation (HD), pressing, and coating. CAPEX is high. Complexity is very high. Know-how requirement is very high. Barriers to entry are very high. Margin potential is 30% to 50%. Environmental risks are medium.

Components production uses machining and assembly. CAPEX is medium. Complexity is medium. Know-how requirement is medium. Barriers to entry are medium. Margin potential is 10% to 20%. Environmental risks are low.

2.3 Where Is the Value?

The rare earth value chain is asymmetric in value distribution. Mining represents only a small fraction of final value. Separation, refining, and magnet production concentrate the highest margins. One kilogram of rare earth ore is worth a few dollars. The same kilogram, transformed into an NdFeB magnet, can appreciate by 100x to 1,000x.

Critical Insight: Countries and companies that dominate only mining capture a minimal fraction of the value chain. Strategic dominance lies in processing and downstream manufacturing.

3. GLOBAL MARKET

3.1 Market Size

The global permanent magnet market is estimated at USD 25.9 to 51.8 billion in 2025, depending on methodology, with projections reaching USD 47.4 to 74.1 billion by 2031 to 2033, representing a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.1% to 6.8% (Grand View Research, 2026; Mordor Intelligence, 2026).

The global NdFeB market was valued at USD 31.73 billion in 2025, with projections reaching USD 65.28 billion by 2035, at a CAGR of 7.48% (Spherical Insights, 2026).

The high-performance magnet market (NdFeB and SmCo) was valued at USD 10.4 billion in 2025, with projections reaching USD 16.88 billion by 2036, at a CAGR of 4.5% (Future Market Insights, 2026).

3.2 Global Production (2024 Data)

• China produced approximately 270,000 tonnes of REO in 2024, representing about 69% of global production.

• The United States produced approximately 45,000 tonnes, representing about 11%.

• Australia (Lynas) produced approximately 22,000 tonnes, representing about 6%.

• Myanmar produced approximately 31,000 tonnes, representing about 8%.

• Thailand produced approximately 3,800 tonnes, representing about 1%.

• Brazil (Serra Verde) produced approximately 5,000 tonnes, representing about 1.3%. This figure is a market estimate; the company does not publicly disclose production numbers.

• Vietnam produced approximately 3,000 tonnes, representing about 0.8%.

• Russia produced approximately 2,600 tonnes, representing about 0.7%.

• Total global production in 2024 was approximately 390,000 tonnes of REO.

• Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025.

3.3 Global Reserves

• China holds approximately 44 million tonnes of REO reserves, representing 33.8% of the global total.

• Vietnam holds approximately 22 million tonnes, representing 16.9%.

• Brazil holds approximately 21 million tonnes, representing 16.1%.

• Russia holds approximately 10 million tonnes, representing 7.7%.

• India holds approximately 6.9 million tonnes, representing 5.3%.

• Australia holds approximately 4.2 million tonnes, representing 3.2%.

• The United States holds approximately 2.3 million tonnes, representing 1.8%.

• Total global reserves are approximately 130 million tonnes of REO.

• Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025.

3.4 China's Position

China dominates the rare earth value chain to an unprecedented degree in modern industrial history. In mining, China controls approximately 69% of global production. In refining and separation, China controls approximately 85% of global capacity. In NdFeB magnet production, China controls approximately 90% of world supply, producing 187,000 tonnes in 2025. In rare earth metal production, China controls approximately 90% of global capacity.

In 2025, China imposed export controls on medium and heavy rare earths and, in October 2025, expanded control extraterritorially. This created a price bifurcation: Dysprosium oxide (CIF Europe) reached USD 800 per kg and Terbium oxide (CIF Europe) reached USD 3,625 per kg, while NdPr established a floor price of USD 110 per kg in the United States through the DoD contract with MP Materials (Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, 2025).

4. GEOPOLITICS AND MINERAL SECURITY

4.1 Global Supply Chain Reconfiguration

• Chinese concentration has created systemic vulnerability. Global responses include:

• United States: The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the Defense Production Act, the DoD-MP Materials agreement (USD 110/kg price floor), and the Magnets Value Chain Support Act of 2026. MP Materials is building a magnet factory in Northlake, Texas, with 10x capacity expansion.

• European Union: The Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), with targets of 10% domestic extraction, 40% domestic processing, and 25% domestic recycling by 2030. Neo Performance Materials operates in Narva, Estonia.

• Japan: Hitachi Metals, TDK, and Shin-Etsu maintain technological leadership but depend on imported feedstock. Japan has advanced recycling programs.

• Australia: Lynas Rare Earths, the only significant producer outside China, is expanding separation capacity and building a magnet plant in Texas (USD 450 million) with Blue Line.

• Canada: Multiple junior companies in development (Neo Performance, Appia Rare Earths, Vital Metals). Federal critical minerals policy is in place.

• India: Approved a scheme of INR 7,280 crore (approximately USD 870 million) for 6,000 tonnes per year of integrated permanent magnet capacity.

• Vietnam and Malaysia: Regional producers with limited downstream capacity.

4.2 Where Brazil Fits

Brazil is one of the few countries with relevant geological reserves, initiated commercial production, an evolving favorable regulatory environment, and growing domestic demand. The global reconfiguration creates a window of opportunity for Brazil to position itself not merely as an ore supplier, but as a processing and magnet manufacturing hub for the Americas and Europe.

5. BRAZIL — GEOLOGICAL POTENTIAL

5.1 Reserves and Resources

Brazil's official reserves, according to USGS (2025), total 21 million tonnes of REO, ranking second in the world. Known resources are potentially much larger, given the under-mapping of Brazil's geological territory. Projected Brazilian demand by 2050 is 12,800 tonnes of rare earths for the energy transition (CEBRI/IDB, 2026).

5.2 Geographic Distribution and Deposit Types

Brazil has multiple mineralization types:

• Ionic Clays are located in Goias (Minacu) and Minas Gerais (Pocos de Caldas). Characteristics include low grade (approximately 0.4% TREO), easy open-pit extraction, low environmental impact, and high recovery rates (approximately 78% to 79%). Relevant projects include Serra Verde (Goias) and Meteoric (Minas Gerais).

• Monazite is located in Minas Gerais (Araxa), Bahia, Goias, and Parana. This heavy mineral is associated with niobium, thorium, and uranium, requiring radioactivity management. Relevant projects include St George Mining (Minas Gerais) and ADL Mineracao (Parana).

• Carbonatites are located in Minas Gerais (Araxa, Tapira), Goias, and Bahia. These are igneous rocks rich in rare earth and niobium minerals. CBMM operates in this context, with rare earths as a niobium byproduct.

• Xenotime is located in Bahia. This is a yttrium and heavy rare earth phosphate. The relevant project is Brazilian Rare Earths (Bahia).

• Laterites and Placer deposits are located in various regions. These are secondary concentration deposits. Projects are in early stages.

5.3 Conceptual Map of Main Poles

The main rare earth poles in Brazil are distributed as follows:

• In the North, Minacu (Goias) hosts Serra Verde, the only commercial production project.

• In the Northeast, Bahia hosts Brazilian Rare Earths (Monte Alto and Rocha da Rocha). Pernambuco and Paraiba have projects in early research stages.

• In the Central-West, Goias hosts Aclara Resources (Carina) and Viridis (Colossus).

• In the Southeast, Minas Gerais hosts Meteoric (Caldeira, Pocos de Caldas), St George Mining (Araxa), and the CIT SENAI ITR technology hub in Lagoa Santa.

• In the South, Parana hosts ADL Mineracao (Buena).

6. MAIN BRAZILIAN PROJECTS

6.1 Serra Verde Project — Mineracao Serra Verde (Goias)

• The company is Mineracao Serra Verde, with mixed capital including international private equity funds and a contribution from the U.S. DFC. The project is located in Minacu, Goias. The deposit type is ionic clay. The elements include Neodymium, Praseodymium, Dysprosium, and Terbium (a mix of LREE and HREE).

• The project stage is commercial production — the only Brazilian project in operation. Capacity is estimated at approximately 5,000 tonnes per year of REO (market estimate; the company does not officially disclose production figures). The technology used is in-situ leaching and heap leaching. Licensing is operational.

• Financing includes a USD 150 million contribution from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in 2025. The product destination is rare earth concentrate for export, likely for processing in China or with Western partners.

• Risks include environmental and social pressure, overlap with land reform settlements (37 mining processes in settlement areas), and sovereignty concerns related to U.S. financing.

• Next milestones include capacity expansion and potential integration with downstream processing.

• Status: Confirmed — the only commercial rare earth production in Brazil.

6.2 Caldeira Project — Meteoric Resources (Minas Gerais)

• The company is Meteoric Resources, listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). The project is located in Pocos de Caldas, Minas Gerais, on the Volcanic Plateau. The deposit type is ionic clay. The elements include Neodymium, Praseodymium, Dysprosium, Terbium, Yttrium, and Scandium.

• The project stage is advanced exploration with an operational pilot plant. Resources are still being defined, with excavations ongoing. The technology is ionic clay leaching, with a pilot plant inaugurated in December 2025. Licensing is in the mining licensing phase.

• Financing includes selection by BNDES/Finep (2025 Public Call) and approval on the BIP Platform (USD 534 million in potential financing).

• Partnerships include a 5-year agreement with CIT SENAI ITR for carbonate supply for magnet testing.

• Next milestones include resource definition, separation studies, and environmental licensing.

• Status: Advanced — operational pilot plant, partnership with Brazilian technology hub.

6.3 Monte Alto / Rocha da Rocha Project — Brazilian Rare Earths (Bahia)

• The company is Brazilian Rare Earths Limited (BRE), listed on the ASX. The project is located in Camacari / Monte Alto, Bahia. The deposit type is xenotime and ionic clay. The elements include Neodymium, Praseodymium, Dysprosium, Terbium, Yttrium, Uranium (as a coproduct), Scandium, Niobium, and Tantalum.

• The project stage is a completed Scoping Study (August 2026). Resources at Monte Alto average 11.3% TREO, more than double that of Western peers. Projected production is 5,276 tonnes per year of NdPr oxide and 2,253 tonnes per year of HRE+ concentrate (including 247 tonnes of Dy+Tb and 989 tonnes of Y).

• CAPEX is estimated at USD 969 million (USD 91 million for rapid concentrate production). Economics show a post-tax NPV of USD 6.0 to 7.9 billion, IRR of 89% to 90%, payback of 1.1 years, and C1 cash cost of USD 21 per kg NdPr equivalent (second-lowest cost globally; lowest Western cost). The technology is simplified processing due to ultra-high grades, using a hub-and-spoke model.

• Licensing is in development. Financing is in capital raising, with potential for joint venture or asset sale.

• Next milestones include the Feasibility Study, licensing, and search for a strategic partner.

• Status: Advanced — scoping study completed with exceptional economic metrics.

6.4 Carina Project — Aclara Resources (Goias)

• The company is Aclara Resources, listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). The project is located in Goias. The deposit type is ionic clay. The elements include Neodymium, Praseodymium, Dysprosium, and Terbium.

• The project stage is advanced development. Financing includes an approved business plan selected by BNDES/Finep (2025).

• Next milestones include feasibility studies and search for construction financing.

• Status: Advanced — approved in the BNDES/Finep program.

6.5 Colossus Project — Viridis Mining & Minerals (Goias)

• The company is Viridis Mining & Minerals, listed on the ASX. The project is located in Goias. The deposit type is ionic clay. The elements include Neodymium, Praseodymium, Dysprosium, and Terbium.

• The project stage is development. Potential includes a mine with projected life of up to 40 years. Financing includes selection by BNDES/Finep (2025).

• Next milestones include reserve definition and feasibility studies.

• Status: Advanced — selected by BNDES/Finep.

6.6 Araxa Project — St George Mining (Minas Gerais)

• The company is St George Mining Limited, listed on the ASX. The project is located in Araxa, Minas Gerais. The deposit type is monazite and carbonatite (associated with niobium). The elements include Neodymium, Praseodymium, Cerium, Lanthanum, and niobium.

• The project stage is exploration and initial development. Partnerships include an agreement with CEFET-MG for a technology center, participation in the MagBras project, an MoU with Invest Minas, and a partnership with NaNum Nanotecnologia for cerium transformation.

• Next milestones include resource definition, metallurgical studies, and technology center development.

• Status: Under Evaluation — structuring technology partnerships.

6.7 Buena Project — ADL Mineracao (Parana)

• The company is ADL Mineracao, a Brazilian company. The project is located in Parana. The deposit type is monazite. The elements include rare earths associated with thorium.

• The project stage is exploration and development.

• Next milestones include resource definition and feasibility studies.

• Status: Under Evaluation.

7. PLAYER MAP — COMPETITIVE MAPPING

7.1 Producing Companies

The only producing company in Brazil is Mineracao Serra Verde, with U.S. and private equity capital. The project is Serra Verde in Goias, at production stage, with approximately 5,000 tonnes per year of REO capacity. The strategy in Brazil is commercial production, potential expansion, and DFC U.S. financing.

7.2 Companies in Advanced Development

• Meteoric Resources, from Australia, operates the Caldeira project in Minas Gerais at pilot plant stage. The highlight is the first national rare earth carbonate delivered to CIT SENAI ITR in 2026.

• Brazilian Rare Earths, from Australia, operates the Monte Alto project in Bahia at scoping study stage. The highlight is ultra-high grades (11.3% TREO) and the lowest Western cost.

• Aclara Resources, from Canada, operates the Carina project in Goias at development stage. The highlight is BNDES/Finep approval.

• Viridis Mining, from Australia, operates the Colossus project in Goias at development stage. The highlight is BNDES/Finep approval and a projected 40-year mine life.

7.3 Companies in Exploration / Early Stage

• St George Mining, from Australia, operates the Araxa project in Minas Gerais at advanced exploration stage.

• ADL Mineracao, a Brazilian company, operates the Buena project in Parana at exploration stage.

• CBMM, a Brazilian company, operates in Araxa, Minas Gerais, evaluating rare earths as a niobium byproduct.

7.4 Processing and Technology Companies

• CIT SENAI ITR is a research and development center with pilot-scale capacity (approximately 100 tonnes per year of magnets potential). It is the first magnet factory in Latin America and the hub of the MagBras project.

• CETEM/MCTI is a research institute with laboratory-scale capacity. It has a patented Pr and Nd separation technology (2022) using solvent extraction.

• IPT/USP is a university/institute with laboratory and pilot-scale capacity. It masters oxide reduction, alloy production, and magnets.

• IPEN is a nuclear institute with laboratory-scale research in rare earth processing.

• UFSC (Federal University of Santa Catarina) has the Magma Laboratory for magnet fabrication and characterization.

• WEG is an industrial company that imports magnets. It is the main Brazilian magnet demander and a MagBras partner.

7.5 Strategic Investors and Financial Institutions

• The U.S. DFC contributed USD 150 million to Serra Verde.

• USA Rare Earth acquired Serra Verde (completed, value not disclosed).

• BNDES (Brazil) has BRL 5 billion available, with 10 rare earth projects pre-selected.

• Finep (Brazil) cooperates with BNDES, providing non-reimbursable resources for R&D.

• IDB (Inter-American Development Bank) finances the CEBRI-MME study for the National Rare Earth Strategy.

• The BIP Platform connects projects with financial institutions.

8. SPECIAL FOCUS — PROCESSING: BRAZIL'S CRITICAL BOTTLENECK

8.1 The Reality of Brazilian Processing

• This is the most critical section of the study. Brazil has abundant geological resources and mining projects in development. However, commercial-scale processing, separation, and refining capacity for rare earths in Brazil is practically nonexistent.

• In mining, Serra Verde produces approximately 5,000 tonnes per year of REO and is operational.

• In beneficiation and concentration, Serra Verde operates, plus pilot plants at Meteoric and Viridis, but capacity is limited.

• In chemical separation (SX), commercial capacity is zero. CETEM has developed laboratory technology, with a patent granted in 2022.

• In separated oxide production, commercial capacity is zero. All separated oxides are imported from China.

• In metal production, commercial capacity is zero. IPT operates a pilot, but all metals are imported from China.

• In alloy production, commercial capacity is zero. CIT SENAI ITR is in development.

• In NdFeB magnet production, commercial capacity is zero. CIT SENAI ITR produces experimental batches of 5 to 10 kg.

• In recycling, commercial capacity is zero. Viridion (Viridis group) recycles magnets abroad in Ireland.

8.2 What Exists: R&D Capacity

• Brazil has relevant scientific competencies, but at laboratory or pilot scale only.

• CETEM (Mineral Technology Center / MCTI): Developed Pr and Nd separation technology using solvent extraction (SX). The patent was granted by INPI in 2022. As stated by Ysrael Marrero Vera of CETEM: "We perform separation with synthetic solutions — not from real mineral rare earth chemical concentrate, because we do not produce it yet." CETEM requires approximately 20 kg of chemical concentrate for tests; few companies in the country can supply this quantity.

• CIT SENAI ITR (Lagoa Santa, Minas Gerais): The first permanent magnet factory in Latin America, inaugurated in 2024/2025. It produced the first experimental batch of NdFeB magnets in December 2025 (5 to 10 kg). In March 2026, it received the first national batch of rare earth carbonate (20 kg) from Meteoric Resources. It masters 60% to 70% of the technological process at pilot scale. It uses imported raw material from China to continue research. It is negotiating the acquisition of an electrolytic reduction furnace at an intermediate scale between pilot and industrial.

• IPT (Technological Research Institute / Sao Paulo): Masters the final stages of the chain: oxide reduction and metal alloy production. The pilot reduction reactor has a capacity of 1 kg of metallic Nd per hour (requiring 1.5 kg of oxide). It partners with WEG and UFSC in the MagBras project.

• UFSC (Federal University of Santa Catarina): Operates the Magma Laboratory for permanent magnet development, mastering all phases of magnet development.

8.3 Why Is Separation the Bottleneck?

• Chemical separation of rare earths is one of the most complex operations in extractive metallurgy for the following reasons:

• First, chemical similarity: The 17 elements have extremely similar chemical properties (all form 3+ ions), making separation extremely difficult.

• Second, multiple stages: Complete separation requires hundreds, sometimes thousands, of solvent extraction (SX) or ion exchange stages.

• Third, specific reagents: It requires specialized organic solvents and high-purity reagents.

• Fourth, minimum scale: An economically viable separation plant requires minimum capacity of approximately 2,000 to 5,000 tonnes per year of REO.

• Fifth, high CAPEX: A medium-scale separation plant costs USD 200 to 500 million.

• Sixth, restricted know-how: Few companies in the world master the technology, mainly in China, with some companies in Japan, the United States, and Australia.

• Conclusion: Brazil currently has no commercial separation capacity. This means that all rare earth concentrate produced in the country (Serra Verde and, in the future, other projects) needs to be exported for processing — typically to China — or requires investment in separation plants in Brazil.

8.4 The MagBras Project: Brazil's Industrial Bet

MagBras is the most important structuring project for Brazilian downstream chain development:

• The main proponent is WEG. Partners include Stellantis, Schulz, IVG Brasil, Vale, Mosaic Fertilizantes, and startups (Integra Laser, Moderna 3D, Lean 4.0). Institutions include SENAI, FUNDEP/UFMG, CIT SENAI ITR, IPT, and UFSC.

• Investment is BRL 73 million for the initial phase. The objective is to implement the complete cycle of Brazilian permanent rare earth magnet production at industrial demonstrator scale.

• The phases are: (1) Base and Processing (months 1 to 18); (2) Fabrication and Forming (months 1 to 24); (3) Finishing and Magnetization (months 13 to 36); and (4) Sustainability and Recycling (months 25 to 36).

• The focus is on NdFeB for electric motors, wind turbines, electronics, and medical equipment.

• Assessment: MagBras is a strategic and necessary project, but at industrial demonstrator scale. It does not replace the need for large-scale international private capital investment in separation, refining, and magnet manufacturing.

9. GAP ANALYSIS OF THE BRAZILIAN CHAIN

9.1 Chain Gap Assessment

• Exploration: Brazil today has active exploration with 6+ companies. Capacity is medium. Main players include Serra Verde, Meteoric, BRE, Aclara, Viridis, St George, and ADL. External dependence is low. Opportunity is medium.

• Mining: Brazil today has one commercial project. Capacity is low to medium. Main player is Serra Verde. External dependence is medium. Opportunity is high for new projects.

• Beneficiation: Brazil today has one operational plant plus pilot plants. Capacity is low. Main players are Serra Verde, Meteoric, and Viridis. External dependence is high. Opportunity is high.

• Concentrate: Brazil produces concentrate but does not separate it. Capacity is low. Main player is Serra Verde. External dependence is very high. Opportunity is very high.

• Separation: Brazil has zero commercial capacity. Capacity is zero. The only player is CETEM (R&D). External dependence is 100%. Opportunity is very high.

• Oxides: Brazil has zero commercial capacity. Capacity is zero. All oxides are imported. External dependence is 100%. Opportunity is very high.

• Metals: Brazil has zero commercial capacity. Capacity is zero. The only player is IPT (pilot). External dependence is 100%. Opportunity is very high.

• Alloys: Brazil has zero commercial capacity. Capacity is zero. The only player is CIT SENAI ITR (pilot). External dependence is 100%. Opportunity is very high.

• Magnets: Brazil has zero commercial capacity. Pilot capacity is approximately 100 tonnes per year potential. The only player is CIT SENAI ITR. External dependence is approximately 100%. Opportunity is very high.

• Components: Brazil imports all components. Capacity is zero. There are no local players. External dependence is 100%. Opportunity is high.

• Recycling: Brazil has zero commercial capacity. Capacity is zero. Viridion operates abroad. External dependence is 100%. Opportunity is medium to high.

9.2 Where Brazil Is Strong

Brazil is strong in abundant geological resources (second-largest reserve in the world). It has a clean and cheap energy matrix (84% renewable). It has consolidated port infrastructure. It has growing domestic demand (10,000 tonnes per year of magnets). It has an emerging technology hub (CIT SENAI ITR, CETEM, IPT, UFSC). And it has favorable government policy (BNDES/Finep, ENTR, MagBras).

9.3 Where Brazil Is Weak

Brazil is weak in commercial chemical separation capacity (zero). It has zero commercial capacity for refining oxides, metals, and alloys. It has zero commercial magnet manufacturing capacity. It has zero commercial recycling capacity. It has limited rail infrastructure in mining regions. And it has scarce specialized workforce for rare earth processing.

9.4 Where International Capital and Technology Can Fill the Gap

International capital and technology can fill the gap through separation plants (SX), with investment of USD 200 to 500 million. Refining plants (oxides and metals) require USD 100 to 300 million. NdFeB magnet factories require USD 200 to 500 million. Recycling technology requires USD 50 to 150 million. Chemical reagent supply is an opportunity for chemical companies. And specialized equipment — reduction furnaces, isostatic presses, coating equipment — represents additional opportunities.

10. INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES CONSIDERING BRAZIL

10.1 Mapping by Status

Confirmed Status:

• USA Rare Earth, from the United States, acquired Serra Verde. The acquisition is completed, with vertical integration planned.

• The U.S. DFC financed Serra Verde with USD 150 million approved.

• Meteoric Resources, from Australia, is active in mining and technology partnership. It has an operational pilot plant and partnership with CIT SENAI ITR.

Advanced Status:

• Brazilian Rare Earths, from Australia, operates the Monte Alto mining project. The scoping study is completed, and the company is searching for a strategic partner.

• Aclara Resources, from Canada, operates the Carina mining project. It is approved in the BNDES/Finep program.

• Viridis Mining, from Australia, operates the Colossus mining project. It is approved in the BNDES/Finep program.

Under Evaluation Status:

• St George Mining, from Australia, operates the Araxa mining and technology project. It has a technology center with CEFET-MG and participates in MagBras.

Speculative Status:

• Neo Performance Materials, from Canada and the United States, is interested in processing and magnets, with interest in expansion outside China. Brazil is a potential market.

• Lynas Rare Earths, from Australia, is focused on processing, with focus on Texas. Brazil is a potential future feedstock source.

• MP Materials, from the United States, is focused on processing and magnets, with focus on the United States. Brazil is a potential supplier.

• Vacuumschmelze (VAC), from Germany, is focused on magnets, with expansion in Europe. Brazil is an emerging market.

• Shin-Etsu, from Japan, is a global leader in magnets, with potential interest in Brazilian feedstock.

11. PROCESSING — OPPORTUNITIES FOR INVESTORS

11.1 Premises for a Processing Plant in Brazil

Available feedstock includes: Serra Verde at approximately 5,000 tonnes per year of REO (expandable); Meteoric in the future with potential for 5,000+ tonnes per year; BRE in the future with 5,276 tonnes per year of NdPr oxide plus 2,253 tonnes per year of HRE+ concentrate; Aclara and Viridis in development. Total projected potential by 2030 is 20,000 to 40,000 tonnes per year of REO.

Ideal location is near the mines (Goias, Minas Gerais) or near the ports (Bahia, Espirito Santo), with access to cheap energy (hydroelectric matrix), industrial water and chemical reagents, and logistics infrastructure (railways, roads).

11.2 Opportunity 1 — Separation Plant (Solvent Extraction)

Product: Separated oxides of Nd, Pr, Dy, Tb, La, Ce, and others. Estimated CAPEX is USD 200 to 500 million at 5,000 tonnes per year of REO scale. Estimated OPEX is USD 8 to 15 per kg of REO processed. Market is export to magnet manufacturers in the United States, Europe, Japan, and Korea, plus future domestic demand. Competitive advantage includes proximity to feedstock, cheap energy, and exemption from concentrate import tariffs. Risks include dependence on offtake agreements, technological complexity, and radioactive waste management (if monazite is used).

11.3 Opportunity 2 — Refining Plant (Oxides to Metals)

Product: Metals of Nd, Pr, Dy, Tb; alloys such as NdPr and NdDy. Estimated CAPEX is USD 100 to 300 million. Market is magnet factories (NdFeB, SmCo). Advantage is vertical integration with the separation plant.

11.4 Opportunity 3 — NdFeB Magnet Factory

Product: Sintered NdFeB magnets (various temperature and energy grades). Estimated CAPEX is USD 200 to 500 million at 2,000 to 5,000 tonnes per year scale. Market is electric motors (WEG, Stellantis), wind turbines, electronics, and defense. Brazilian demand is 10,000 tonnes per year (all imported). Advantage is import substitution, access to the South American market, and proximity to demand.

11.5 Opportunity 4 — Magnet Recycling

Product: Recovered rare earth oxides from end-of-life magnets. Estimated CAPEX is USD 50 to 150 million. Feedstock is magnets from EV motors, wind turbines, electronics, and hard disk drives. Advantage is lower environmental impact and cost 30% below virgin mining (based on Japanese reference data).

11.6 Opportunity 5 — Technology and Equipment

Opportunities include electrolytic reduction furnaces, solvent extraction (SX) systems, isostatic presses, magnet coating systems, and quality control and analysis equipment.

12. BRAZILIAN APPLICABLE LEGISLATION

12.1 Mineral Regulatory Framework

• The Federal Constitution (CF/88, 1988) establishes that minerals are Union property and subject to federal regulation.

• The Mining Code (Law 6,567/1967, updated) provides rules for research, mining, and royalties.

• The New Artisanal Mining Law (Law 14,904/2024) regulates artisanal mining activity.

• The National Mining Policy (Decree 9,587/2018) provides guidelines for the mineral sector.

• The National Mining Policy 2050 (PNM 2050) is under development and provides a long-term vision for the sector.

12.2 Regulatory Agencies

• The National Mining Agency (ANM) grants mining titles, conducts oversight, and collects CFEM royalties.

• The Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) defines mineral policy and the National Rare Earth Strategy.

• IBAMA and state environmental agencies conduct federal and state environmental licensing.

• ICMBio manages conservation units.

• FUNAI manages indigenous lands.

• IPHAN manages archaeological heritage.

12.3 Taxation and Royalties

• The Financial Compensation for Mineral Resource Exploitation (CFEM) applies a 2% royalty rate for rare earths (Law 13,540/2017).

• Import Tax (II) varies by NCM code.

• Tax on Industrialized Products (IPI) applies to processed products.

• PIS/COFINS taxes apply.

• Corporate Income Tax (IRPJ) and Social Contribution on Net Income (CSLL) combine for 34% on profitable companies.

12.4 Pending Legislation (Rare Earth Specific)

• Bill 2780/2024, in the Chamber of Deputies, was approved by the Chamber and is now in the Senate. It classifies rare earths as strategic minerals and provides incentives for beneficiation.

• Bill 3659/2025 is under consideration. It provides a specific regulatory framework for rare earths and industrialization.

• Bill 3829/2025 is under consideration. It addresses beneficiation and industrialization of rare earths.

Note: As of August 2026, there is no specific law for rare earths in Brazil. Mining is regulated by the general Mining Code. Approval of Bill 2780/2024 and related projects will create a specific legal framework, potentially with differentiated fiscal and regulatory incentives.

12.5 Foreign Investment

The Central Bank requires mandatory registration of foreign capital (simplified via electronic RDE-IED). There are no sector-specific restrictions for rare earth mining. Repatriation is permitted, subject to taxation. Mining is prohibited on indigenous lands (Federal Constitution, Article 231).

13. CRITICAL MINERALS POLICY

13.1 National Rare Earth Strategy (ENTR)

In January 2026, the Ministry of Mines and Energy initiated technical work for the construction of the National Rare Earth Strategy (ENTR), with support from the IDB and leadership from CEBRI (consortium with Vallya and BMA Advogados).

Preliminary targets discussed include achieving 20% of global rare earth production and installing 40,000 tonnes per year of separation capacity, with development of an integrated production chain from mining to magnets.

Deliverables include supply mapping, demand assessment and priority industrial sectors, sustainability guidelines, governance and monitoring proposals, and preliminary recommendations for the National Strategy.

13.2 Financing Programs

• The BNDES-Finep Public Call (2025) was launched on January 7, 2025. It received 124 proposals (BRL 85.2 billion in demand). Fifty-six projects were selected (BRL 45.8 billion in projected investments), including 10 rare earth projects. Instruments include credit, equity participation, non-reimbursable R&D resources, and economic subsidy. The initial available amount was BRL 5 billion, with expected leverage of 5x to 10x.

• Rare earth companies selected include Serra Verde Mineracao, Aclara Resources, Viridis Mining & Minerals (Colossus), and Meteoric Resources.

• The BIP Platform (Brazil Climate Investments) connects projects with financial institutions. The Meteoric project has USD 534 million in potential, and the Serra Verde project has USD 300 million in potential. The BIP Platform does not provide direct financial contribution; it connects projects with financial institutions.

• The BRL 1 billion Fund (BNDES-MME, 2024) was launched in March 2024, focused on strategic minerals, managed by BNDES.

13.3 New Industry Brazil (Nova Industria Brasil)

The rare earth chain is integrated into thematic axis 5 of New Industry Brazil: "Bioeconomy, decarbonization, and energy transition and security to guarantee resources for future generations."

13.4 Regulatory Environment Assessment

The Brazilian regulatory environment for rare earths is evolving favorably, with explicit recognition of rare earths as strategic minerals, billion-dollar financing programs in implementation, a national strategy under development, incentives for value-added aggregation (processing, separation, magnets), and policy for technological and scientific autonomy.

However, gaps remain, including absence of specific law (under consideration), complexity of environmental licensing, uncertainty about concrete fiscal incentives, and sovereignty concerns with foreign financing (Serra Verde/DFC case).

14. PROJECT ECONOMICS

14.1 Publicly Available Data

• For the Brazilian Rare Earths (BRE) Monte Alto project, CAPEX is estimated at USD 969 million. Post-tax NPV is USD 6.0 to 7.9 billion. IRR is 89% to 90%. Payback is 1.1 years. C1 cash cost is USD 21 per kg NdPr equivalent.

• For the Meteoric Caldeira project, CAPEX, NPV, IRR, and cash cost are all under definition.

• For Serra Verde, CAPEX, OPEX, NPV, IRR, and cash cost are not publicly disclosed (private company).

Note: BRE data is based on the Scoping Study published in August 2026. This is a preliminary estimate (Company Claim / Pre-Feasibility level), not a confirmed reserve or feasibility. Serra Verde data is not publicly available.

14.2 Reference Prices (2025–2026)

• NdPr oxide (99% FOB China) averaged USD 69 in 2025 and reached USD 110 to 113 by July 2026, an increase of 42% in 2025.

• Dysprosium oxide is at USD 452, trending upward.

• Terbium oxide is at USD 1,720, trending upward.

• Dysprosium oxide (CIF Europe) is at USD 800, very high due to China/ex-China bifurcation.

• Terbium oxide (CIF Europe) is at USD 3,625, very high due to China/ex-China bifurcation.

Sources: USGS MCS 2026; Argus Media; Benchmark Mineral Intelligence; True Source Metals.

15. LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

15.1 Assessment by Mode

• Railways: The network is limited, with North-South and Ferronorte as the main lines. This restricts projects in Goias and Minas Gerais but creates expansion opportunities.

• Roads: The network is extensive but has maintenance deficits. It is the main current mode, with high costs for long distances.

• Ports: Santos (Sao Paulo), Vitoria (Espirito Santo), Salvador (Bahia), and Paranagua (Parana) are consolidated. They provide Atlantic access for export and proximity to Bahia projects.

• Energy: The matrix is 84% renewable with competitive prices. This is a competitive advantage for energy-intensive processing.

• Industrial water: Available in most regions. It is a critical requirement for leaching and processing.

• Chemical reagents: Local production of acids and bases exists, but specialized organic solvents are imported. There is partial dependence for separation reagents.

• Workforce: Scarce in rare earth processing but abundant in general mining. Training and technology transfer are needed.

15.2 Potentially Competitive Regions

Goias is excellent for mining (Serra Verde, Aclara, Viridis), good for processing (energy, water), and developing for downstream.

Minas Gerais is excellent for mining (Meteoric, St George), excellent for processing (CIT SENAI ITR, IPT, infrastructure), and developing for downstream.

Bahia is excellent for mining (BRE), good for processing (Camacari petrochemical hub), and developing for downstream.

Espirito Santo is limited for mining, excellent for processing (port, energy, logistics), and has potential for downstream.

Sao Paulo is limited for mining, excellent for processing (IPT, market, logistics), and excellent for downstream (WEG, Stellantis).

16. BRAZILIAN DEMAND

16.1 Current Consumption

Brazil imports approximately 10,000 tonnes per year of permanent magnets (CGEE/MCTI, 2025). Of this total, approximately 1,000 tonnes go to advanced technology productions, including electric motors, air compressors, generators, and electromechanical systems.

16.2 Demanding Sectors

• Electric motors, led by WEG and other manufacturers, use NdFeB magnets and are experiencing accelerated growth.

• Wind energy, including onshore and offshore turbines, uses NdFeB magnets (with Dy and Tb) and is undergoing aggressive expansion, particularly offshore in the Northeast.

• Automotive, including EVs and hybrids from Stellantis, VW, GM, and BYD, uses NdFeB magnets and is experiencing exponential growth.

• Defense, including missiles, radar, and communications, uses SmCo and NdFeB magnets (with Dy and Tb) and is strategically important.

• Electronics, including smartphones, computers, and audio equipment, uses NdFeB and ferrite magnets and is stable to growing.

• Medical equipment, including MRI machines, uses NdFeB and Gadolinium and is growing.

• Industrial automation, including servomotors and robotics, uses NdFeB magnets and is experiencing accelerated growth.

• Catalysts, including petroleum refining, uses Lanthanum and Cerium and is stable.

16.3 Demand Projection (Brazil)

By 2050, Brazil is projected to require 12,800 tonnes of rare earths for the energy transition (CEBRI/IDB, 2026). Growth is driven by vehicle electrification, offshore wind expansion, and Industry 4.0.

17. EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

17.1 Brazilian Foreign Trade in Rare Earths

Data on Brazilian foreign trade in rare earths is limited due to low production and aggregated NCM classification. However, the following is observed:

• Exports are concentrated in rare earth concentrate from Serra Verde (quantities not publicly disclosed).

• Imports are permanent magnets, rare earth oxides, and metals — practically 100% originating from China.

• Brazil has a structural deficit, being a net importer of all value-added rare earth products.

Note: Detailed Comex Stat data for specific rare earth NCMs (2805.30.10, 2846.10.10, etc.) is not consolidated at the individual element level due to the low granularity of Brazilian classification for this segment.

18. BRAZIL'S COMPETITIVENESS

18.1 Comparative Scorecard

• Resources: Brazil scores very high (5 out of 5), ranking second globally. China also scores very high (5). Australia scores medium (3). The United States scores low (2). Canada scores medium (3, emerging).

• Mining: Brazil scores low (2 out of 5), with only one project. China scores very high (5). Australia scores high (4). The United States scores medium (3). Canada scores low (2).

• Processing: Brazil scores very low (1 out of 5), with zero capacity. China scores very high (5). Australia scores high (4). The United States scores medium (3). Canada scores low (2).

• Technology: Brazil scores low (2 out of 5), with pilot R&D. China scores very high (5). Australia scores high (4). The United States scores high (4). Canada scores medium (3).

• Energy: Brazil scores very high (5 out of 5), with 84% renewable. China scores high (4). Australia scores high (4). The United States scores high (4). Canada scores high (4).

• Infrastructure: Brazil scores medium (3 out of 5), with good ports but limited railways. China scores very high (5). Australia scores high (4). The United States scores high (4). Canada scores high (4).

• Regulation: Brazil scores medium (3 out of 5), evolving. China scores high (4). Australia scores high (4). The United States scores high (4). Canada scores high (4).

• Capital: Brazil scores medium (3 out of 5), with BNDES/Finep available. China scores very high (5). Australia scores high (4). The United States scores very high (5). Canada scores high (4).

• Market: Brazil scores high (4 out of 5), with 10,000 tonnes per year of magnet demand and growth. China scores very high (5). Australia scores medium (3). The United States scores high (4). Canada scores medium (3).

19. RISKS

19.1 Risk Analysis

• Regulatory Risk: Probability is medium, impact is high. Mitigation includes tracking Bill 2780/2024 progress and engaging with ANM and MME.

• Environmental Risk: Probability is high, impact is high. Mitigation includes rigorous licensing, radioactive waste management (for monazite), and ISO 14001 compliance.

• Geological Risk: Probability is low, impact is medium. Mitigation includes technical due diligence and JORC/NI 43-101 studies.

• Metallurgical Risk: Probability is medium, impact is high. Mitigation includes pilot testing, partnerships with CETEM/IPT, and proven technology.

• Technology Risk: Probability is medium, impact is high. Mitigation includes joint ventures with technology companies (Lynas, Neo, VAC) and know-how transfer.

• Financing Risk: Probability is medium, impact is high. Mitigation includes diversification of sources (BNDES, Finep, DFC, IDB, equity, project finance).

• Commodity Price Risk: Probability is high, impact is medium. Mitigation includes long-term offtake contracts with price floors (MP Materials/DoD model) and hedging.

• Offtake Risk: Probability is medium, impact is high. Mitigation includes long-term contracts with OEMs (WEG, Stellantis, turbine manufacturers).

• Infrastructure Risk: Probability is medium, impact is medium. Mitigation includes pre-investment logistics assessment and infrastructure partnerships.

• Political Risk: Probability is medium, impact is medium. Mitigation includes investor diversification, anti-corruption compliance, and institutional engagement.

• Community/Social Risk: Probability is high, impact is high. Mitigation includes prior consultation, local development programs, and social license.

• Supply Chain Risk: Probability is high, impact is high. Mitigation includes geographic diversification, strategic stockpiling, and verticalization.

• Chinese Competition Risk: Probability is very high, impact is very high. Mitigation includes ESG differentiation, friend-shoring, and Western government incentives.

• Currency Risk: Probability is high, impact is medium. Mitigation includes currency hedging and dollar-denominated revenues.

• Execution Risk: Probability is medium, impact is high. Mitigation includes experienced project management and qualified EPC contractors.

20. SWOT ANALYSIS

20.1 Strengths

Brazil holds the second-largest rare earth reserves in the world (USGS, 2025). It has a clean energy matrix at 84% renewable, an advantage for energy-intensive processing. It has growing domestic demand of 10,000 tonnes per year of magnets, projected to reach 12,800 tonnes by 2050. It has an emerging technology hub (CIT SENAI ITR, CETEM, IPT, UFSC). It has billion-dollar financing programs available (BNDES/Finep at BRL 5 billion). And it has a strategic geographic position with Atlantic access and proximity to the United States and Europe.

20.2 Weaknesses

Brazil has zero commercial capacity for separation, refining, and magnet manufacturing. It has near-total dependence on China for magnets and processed products. It has limited rail infrastructure in mining regions. It has scarce specialized workforce for rare earth processing. It has complex and lengthy environmental licensing. And it lacks specific legislation for rare earths (under consideration).

20.3 Opportunities

Global supply chain reconfiguration is creating friend-shoring, near-shoring, and mineral security opportunities. The China/ex-China price bifurcation is creating a premium for non-Chinese products. A government financing window is open (BNDES/Finep, DFC, IDB). Explosive demand is coming from EVs, offshore wind, robotics, and defense. Vertical integration from mining to magnets offers higher margins. And magnet recycling from end-of-life products is emerging as a new feedstock source.

20.4 Threats

Chinese price dominance includes dumping and state subsidies. Chinese export restrictions may affect equipment and reagents. Brazilian legislative delays are possible. Socio-environmental pressure exists from settlements, indigenous lands, and conservation units. Oversupply risk exists if multiple projects advance simultaneously without coordination. And competition for capital exists with other hubs (Australia, Canada, Africa).

21. SCENARIOS 2030–2035

21.1 Conservative Scenario

• Premises: Only Serra Verde remains in commercial production (5,000 to 8,000 tonnes per year of REO). No separation plant is built in Brazil. Projects in development are delayed by licensing or financing. Brazil remains a concentrate exporter and magnet importer.

• Result: Brazilian production reaches approximately 8,000 tonnes per year of REO. Separation capacity remains zero. Magnet production remains zero commercially. Global share is less than 2%.

21.2 Base Case Scenario

• Premises: Serra Verde expands to approximately 10,000 tonnes per year of REO. Two to three new projects enter production (Meteoric, BRE, Aclara, or Viridis). One separation plant is built (capacity: 5,000 to 10,000 tonnes per year of REO). One pilot/industrial magnet factory is built (500 to 2,000 tonnes per year). The National Rare Earth Strategy is implemented.

• Result: Brazilian production reaches approximately 25,000 to 35,000 tonnes per year of REO. Separation capacity reaches 5,000 to 10,000 tonnes per year. Magnet production reaches 500 to 2,000 tonnes per year. Global share is 5% to 8%. Cumulative investments reach USD 3 to 5 billion.

21.3 Accelerated Scenario

• Premises: Four to five mining projects operate. Two to three separation plants operate (total capacity: 20,000 to 40,000 tonnes per year of REO). Two to three magnet factories operate (total capacity: 5,000 to 10,000 tonnes per year). The technology hub is consolidated (CIT SENAI ITR plus international partners). Recycling operates at commercial scale. Offtake agreements are signed with global OEMs (automotive, wind, defense).

• Result: Brazilian production reaches approximately 50,000 to 70,000 tonnes per year of REO. Separation capacity reaches 20,000 to 40,000 tonnes per year. Magnet production reaches 5,000 to 10,000 tonnes per year. Global share is 10% to 15%. Cumulative investments reach USD 10 to 15 billion. Brazil becomes a processing hub for the Americas and Europe.

22. VISION 2050

22.1 Where Brazil Could Be

If Brazil succeeds in building a complete rare earth chain (mining to magnets), the country could:

• Achieve 15% to 20% of global processed rare earth production. Become the largest permanent magnet hub outside Asia. Meet 100% of domestic demand (motors, wind, EVs, defense). Export magnets and components to the United States, Europe, and Latin America. Develop technological autonomy in advanced materials. And integrate into global energy transition and defense supply chains.

22.2 Relation to PNM 2050

The National Mining Policy 2050 (PNM 2050) positions critical minerals as strategic for sustainable development. Rare earths are central to vehicle electrification, offshore wind expansion, industrial automation and robotics, technological sovereignty and defense, and low-carbon energy transition.

23. ENTRY MODELS FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES

23.1 Structuring Options

• Greenfield: Construction of a new plant. Advantages include total control and proprietary technology. Disadvantages include high CAPEX, licensing from scratch, and long timeline. Capital required is USD 200 to 500 million. Risk is high. Speed is slow (3 to 5 years).

• Joint Venture: Partnership with a Brazilian company. Advantages include access to local resources and risk mitigation. Disadvantages include shared control and strategic alignment challenges. Capital required is USD 50 to 200 million. Risk is medium. Speed is medium (2 to 3 years).

• Strategic Investment: Participation in an existing project. Advantages include access to validated resources and speed. Disadvantages include complex due diligence and partner dependence. Capital required is USD 20 to 100 million. Risk is medium. Speed is fast (1 to 2 years).

• Offtake Agreement: Future purchase contract. Advantages include feedstock guarantee without operational exposure. Disadvantages include no operational upside and supplier dependence. Capital required is low (guarantees only). Risk is low. Speed is immediate.

• Technology Partnership: Technology transfer. Advantages include royalty revenues and low CAPEX. Disadvantages include IP protection and partner execution dependence. Capital required is low. Risk is medium. Speed is medium.

• Acquisition: Purchase of a company or project. Advantages include immediate asset access. Disadvantages include acquisition price and hidden liabilities. Capital required is USD 50 to 500 million. Risk is medium to high. Speed is fast.

• Trading: International buying and selling. Advantages include low CAPEX and high liquidity. Disadvantages include thin margins and price exposure. Capital required is low. Risk is high. Speed is immediate.

• Industrial Cluster: Installation in an industrial park. Advantages include synergies and shared infrastructure. Disadvantages include concentration risk and ecosystem dependence. Capital required is USD 100 to 300 million. Risk is medium. Speed is medium.

23.2 Recommendation by Investor Profile

• For mining companies, Joint Venture or Acquisition is recommended, providing access to ionic clay deposits.

• For rare earth processors, Greenfield or Joint Venture is recommended, for a separation plant in Goias or Minas Gerais.

• For chemical companies, Greenfield or Joint Venture is recommended, for separation reagent production.

• For magnet manufacturers, Joint Venture or Cluster is recommended, for an NdFeB factory near demand (Sao Paulo or Minas Gerais).

• For EV supply chain companies, Offtake or Strategic Investment is recommended, for supply security of NdPr/Dy/Tb.

• For private equity, Strategic Investment or Project Finance is recommended, for capital to expand existing projects.

• For sovereign wealth funds, Strategic Investment or Joint Venture is recommended, for exposure to a long-term strategic asset.

• For trading companies, Offtake or Trading is recommended, for price arbitrage between China and ex-China markets.

24. PRIORITY OPPORTUNITIES

24.1 Opportunity Ranking

• Separation Plant (SX): Market potential is very high (5 out of 5). Entry barrier is very high (5). CAPEX is high. Strategic value is very high (5). Time to market is 3 to 4 years. Overall score: First priority.

• NdFeB Magnets: Market potential is very high (5). Entry barrier is very high (5). CAPEX is high. Strategic value is very high (5). Time to market is 3 to 5 years. Overall score: Second priority.

• Mining (New Projects): Market potential is high (4). Entry barrier is medium (3). CAPEX is medium to high. Strategic value is high (4). Time to market is 2 to 4 years. Overall score: Third priority.

• Refining (Metals/Alloys): Market potential is high (4). Entry barrier is very high (5). CAPEX is medium to high. Strategic value is high (4). Time to market is 3 to 4 years. Overall score: Fourth priority.

• Recycling: Market potential is medium (3). Entry barrier is medium (3). CAPEX is medium. Strategic value is high (4). Time to market is 2 to 3 years. Overall score: Fifth priority.

• Technology/Equipment: Market potential is medium (3). Entry barrier is medium (3). CAPEX is low to medium. Strategic value is medium (3). Time to market is 1 to 2 years. Overall score: Sixth priority.

24.2 The 5 Most Interesting Opportunities for International Investors

• First — Solvent Extraction (SX) Separation Plant: This is the critical bottleneck of the chain. Whoever builds first will have privileged access to Brazilian feedstock and the growing ex-China market.

• Second — NdFeB Magnet Factory: Domestic demand is 10,000 tonnes per year, 100% imported. Additional South American market. Proximity to WEG, Stellantis, and the wind sector.

• Third — Mining Expansion (Ionic Clays): High-quality, low-cost, low-environmental-impact deposits. Joint venture opportunity with advanced-stage development companies.

• Fourth — Refining Plant (Oxides to Metals/Alloys): Essential intermediate step for vertical integration. Lower complexity than separation but necessary for a magnet factory.

• Fifth — Magnet Recycling: The wave of end-of-life from the first EVs and wind turbines will begin around 2030+. First-mover opportunity in Latin America.

25. INVESTMENT THESIS — WHY BRAZIL RARE EARTHS?

25.1 The Thesis in 10 Pillars

• Pillar 1 — Resource Advantage: Brazil holds the second-largest reserves in the world (21 million tonnes of REO), with multiple deposit types.

• Pillar 2 — Strategic Global Position: Brazil is the only country with resources, initiated production, domestic demand, and Atlantic access.

• Pillar 3 — Supply Chain Diversification: Global reconfiguration is being forced by Chinese export controls.

• Pillar 4 — Emerging Domestic Industry: Demand is 10,000+ tonnes per year of magnets, projected to grow to 12,800 tonnes by 2050.

• Pillar 5 — Processing Gap: Zero commercial separation capacity represents the largest investment opportunity.

• Pillar 6 — Government Support: BRL 5 billion from BNDES/Finep, a National Strategy under development, and Bill 2780/2024.

• Pillar 7 — Infrastructure: 84% renewable energy matrix, consolidated ports, and cheap energy.

• Pillar 8 — Technology Opportunity: CIT SENAI ITR, CETEM, IPT, UFSC hub, and the MagBras project (BRL 73 million).

• Pillar 9 — Export Potential: Access to the United States, Europe, and Latin America without dependence on China.

• Pillar 10 — Long-Term Demand: EVs, offshore wind, robotics, and defense electrification are irreversible trends through 2050.

26. WHO SHOULD LOOK AT BRAZIL?

26.1 Mapping by Profile

• Mining companies should look at Brazil for access to low-cost ionic clay deposits and an evolving regulatory environment.

• Rare earth processors should look at Brazil for abundant developing feedstock, growing ex-China demand, and cheap energy.

• Chemical companies should look at Brazil for demand for separation reagents and local production opportunities.

• Separation technology companies should look at Brazil for a greenfield SX plant market and partnerships with CETEM/CIT SENAI ITR.

• Magnet manufacturers should look at Brazil for 10,000 tonnes per year of domestic demand, the South American market, and friend-shoring.

• EV supply chain companies should look at Brazil for supply security of NdPr/Dy/Tb outside China and proximity to Stellantis and WEG.

• Wind turbine manufacturers should look at Brazil for Brazilian offshore wind expansion and the need for high-performance magnets.

• Defense companies should look at Brazil for heavy rare earths (Dy, Tb) for strategic applications and technological sovereignty.

• Electronics companies should look at Brazil for growing demand for miniaturized magnets and an emerging technology hub.

• Recycling companies should look at Brazil for first-mover opportunity in magnet recycling in Latin America.

• Industrial equipment manufacturers should look at Brazil for high-efficiency motors (IE4/IE5) and import substitution.

• Trading companies should look at Brazil for price arbitrage and offtake of Brazilian concentrate.

• Private equity and family offices should look at Brazil for project finance with potentially high returns (IRR above 30% in processing).

• Sovereign wealth funds should look at Brazil for exposure to a long-term strategic asset aligned with ESG.

• Infrastructure investors should look at Brazil for rail and port infrastructure for critical minerals.

27. HOW TO ENTER BRAZIL — PRACTICAL ROADMAP

27.1 Step by Step

• Step 1 — Market Assessment: Estimated 2 to 4 months. Requires local consulting and Trust Brazil support.

• Step 2 — Identify Local Partners: Estimated 3 to 6 months. Requires engagement with Brazilian companies, FIEMG, Invest Minas, and Invest Bahia.

• Step 3 — Technical Due Diligence: Estimated 4 to 8 months. Requires technical consulting, CETEM, and universities.

• Step 4 — Legal Due Diligence: Estimated 2 to 4 months. Requires Brazilian law firms (BMA, Mattos Filho, etc.).

• Step 5 — Environmental Assessment: Estimated 6 to 12 months. Requires environmental consulting and IBAMA/state agencies.

• Step 6 — Project Structure: Estimated 2 to 4 months. Requires legal advisory and accounting.

• Step 7 — Investment Structure: Estimated 2 to 4 months. Requires investment banking, BNDES, and Finep.

• Step 8 — Licensing (ANM, Ibama): Estimated 12 to 24 months. Requires ANM and environmental agencies.

• Step 9 — Financing: Estimated 6 to 12 months. Requires BNDES, Finep, commercial banks, and export credit agencies.

• Step 10 — Construction / Operation: Estimated 24 to 48 months. Requires EPC contractors and technology suppliers.

27.2 Where an International Company Needs Brazilian Partners

• Environmental licensing is impossible without local expertise and relationships with state agencies.

• Community relations are critical; local partners are essential for social license.

• ANM regulation requires specific knowledge of the Mining Code for research and mining processes.

• Access to public financing is prioritized by BNDES and Finep for projects with Brazilian partners.

• Logistics and infrastructure require local knowledge of railways, ports, and roads.

• Specialized workforce training requires partnerships with SENAI and universities.

28. TRUST BRAZIL — ROLE AND OPPORTUNITY

This study is published by Trust Brazil, a Brazilian platform specialized in facilitating the entry and relationship of international companies with the Brazilian market.

International companies interested in market entry and opportunity assessment, local partners and matchmaking with Brazilian companies, business verification and commercial due diligence, commercial representation and local presence structuring, market intelligence and regulatory monitoring, government and business ecosystem engagement, project development and investment structuring support, and soft landing and initial operation in Brazil can use Trust Brazil as a strategic and reliable entry point to navigate the Brazilian rare earth and critical minerals ecosystem.

29. CONCLUSION

29.1 What Brazil Already Has

Brazil holds the second-largest rare earth reserves in the world (USGS, 2025), at 21 million tonnes of REO. It has initiated commercial production with Serra Verde, the only operational project in Latin America outside the United States. It has multiple projects in advanced development with 6+ companies at various stages. It has robust domestic demand of 10,000 tonnes per year of imported magnets, with accelerated growth projected. It has an emerging technology hub with CIT SENAI ITR, CETEM, IPT, and UFSC. And it has available government financing of BRL 5 billion from BNDES/Finep, plus incentive programs.

29.2 What Brazil Is Building

Brazil is building the National Rare Earth Strategy (ENTR), with targets of 20% of global production and 40,000 tonnes per year of separation capacity. It is building the MagBras project, an industrial demonstrator of the complete cycle from mining to magnets. It is building a specific regulatory framework through Bill 2780/2024 and related bills. And it is building international partnerships, including the U.S. DFC contribution and Australian and Canadian companies in development.

29.3 What Brazil Still Lacks

Brazil still lacks commercial chemical separation capacity (zero). It lacks commercial refining capacity for oxides, metals, and alloys (zero). It lacks commercial magnet manufacturing capacity (zero). It lacks commercial recycling capacity (zero). It lacks rail infrastructure for minerals in key regions. It lacks a specialized workforce for rare earth processing. And it lacks an integrated industrial ecosystem for critical minerals.

29.4 The Real Opportunity

The investment opportunity in Brazil is not merely extracting rare earths from the soil. It is building the parts of the chain that do not yet exist — separation, refining, metals, alloys, and magnets — capturing the highest margins in the value chain and serving global demand for diversified sources outside China.

An international investor or company entering Brazil today to build processing and downstream capacity will have:

• Privileged access to the second-largest reserve in the world for feedstock. Proximity to a domestic market of 10,000+ tonnes per year of magnets, growing rapidly. Clean and cheap energy for energy-intensive processing. Government support through BNDES, Finep, and critical minerals policies. Strategic positioning to export to the United States and Europe in a bifurcating market. And a first-mover window in a country where downstream competition does not yet exist.

• The risk is real — environmental licensing, technological complexity, offtake dependence, Chinese competition — but the potential reward is proportional to the size of the gap. And the Brazilian gap in rare earth processing is, possibly, the largest in the world between a country with abundant geological resources and the total absence of industrial value-added capacity.

30. FINAL OPPORTUNITY MAP — BRAZIL RARE EARTH OPPORTUNITY MAP

• Exploration: Current status is active with 6+ companies. Main players include Meteoric, BRE, Aclara, Viridis, St George, and ADL. Gap is incomplete mapping. Investment opportunity is in geophysics, drilling, and mineral research. Risk is low.

• Mining: Current status is one commercial project. Main player is Serra Verde. Gap is scarcity of operational projects. Investment opportunity is in new mines (ionic clay, monazite). Risk is medium.

• Beneficiation: Current status is limited. Main players are Serra Verde and pilot plants. Gap is low scale. Investment opportunity is in concentration plants. Risk is medium.

• Concentrate: Current status is produced but not separated. Main player is Serra Verde. Gap is zero commercial separation. Investment opportunity is integrated with separation. Risk is high.

• Separation: Current status is zero commercial capacity. Main player is CETEM (R&D only). Gap is 100% external dependence. Investment opportunity is an SX plant (USD 200 to 500 million). Risk is high.

• Oxides: Current status is zero commercial capacity. All oxides are imported. Gap is 100% external dependence. Investment opportunity is an oxide plant (USD 100 to 300 million). Risk is high.

• Metals: Current status is zero commercial capacity. Main player is IPT (pilot only). Gap is 100% external dependence. Investment opportunity is a metals/alloys plant (USD 100 to 300 million). Risk is high.

• Alloys: Current status is zero commercial capacity. Main player is CIT SENAI ITR (pilot only). Gap is 100% external dependence. Investment opportunity is integrated with metals. Risk is high.

• Magnets: Current status is zero commercial capacity. Main player is CIT SENAI ITR (pilot only). Gap is 100% import dependence. Investment opportunity is an NdFeB factory (USD 200 to 500 million). Risk is very high.

• Components: Current status is importation. There are no local players. Gap is zero local production. Investment opportunity is in machining and assembly. Risk is medium.

• Recycling: Current status is zero commercial capacity. Viridion operates abroad. Gap is zero local capacity. Investment opportunity is a recycling plant (USD 50 to 150 million). Risk is medium.

• Technology: Current status is emerging R&D. Main players are CETEM, IPT, UFSC, and CIT SENAI ITR. Gap is know-how transfer. Investment opportunity is in equipment, reagents, and licensing. Risk is medium.

• Financing: Current status is BRL 5 billion available (~USD 1 billion). Main players are BNDES, Finep, DFC, and IDB. Gap is scarcity of international equity. Investment opportunity is in project finance, private equity, and joint ventures. Risk is medium.

31. SOURCES AND REFERENCES

31.1 Brazilian Government Sources

• National Mining Agency (ANM): Mining process database, 2026, www.gov.br/anm

• Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME): National Rare Earth Strategy (ENTR) — work initiated, January 2026, www.gov.br/mme

• BNDES: Public Call for Business Plans for Strategic Minerals, January 2025, www.bndes.gov.br

• Finep: Joint BNDES-Finep Public Call, January 2025, www.finep.gov.br

• Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE): Territorial and economic data, 2025, www.ibge.gov.br

• Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Ibama): Environmental licensing, 2026, www.gov.br/ibama

31.2 International Organizations

• U.S. Geological Survey (USGS): Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 and 2026

• International Energy Agency (IEA): Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025

• Inter-American Development Bank (IDB): MET Project — Mining for Energy Transition, 2026

• UN Comtrade: International trade data, 2024–2025

31.3 Company Sources

• Brazilian Rare Earths Limited: Scoping Study — Monte Alto / Rocha da Rocha, August 2026

• Meteoric Resources: Investor Presentations and ASX filings, 2025–2026

• Serra Verde: Corporate releases (does not disclose detailed financial data), 2025–2026

• Aclara Resources: TSX filings and BNDES selection, 2025

• Viridis Mining & Minerals: ASX filings and BNDES selection, 2025

• St George Mining Limited: ASX filings and technology partnerships, 2025–2026

• CIT SENAI ITR: FIEMG / SENAI releases, 2025–2026

31.4 Market and Analysis Sources

• Benchmark Mineral Intelligence: Rare Earths Price Assessment, 2025

• Argus Media: Argus Non-Ferrous Markets, 2025–2026

• Fastmarkets: NdPr oxide FOB China assessment, 2025–2026

• Mordor Intelligence: Permanent Magnet Market Report, 2026

• Grand View Research: Permanent Magnets Market Size & Share, 2026

• Spherical Insights: Global NdFeB Permanent Magnets Market, 2026

• Future Market Insights: High Performance Permanent Magnet Market, 2026

• True Source Metals: Rare Earth Elements — Prices, Production, Reserves, 2026

• CGEE/MCTI: Rare Earths in Brazil: State of the Art, Scenarios and Strategic Roadmap 2026–2040, 2025

• CEBRI: The Role of Brazil in the Global Agenda of Critical and Strategic Minerals, 2024–2026

GLOSSARY

REE: Rare Earth Elements

REO: Rare Earth Oxides — standard measurement unit

TREO: Total Rare Earth Oxides

LREE: Light Rare Earth Elements

HREE: Heavy Rare Earth Elements

NdFeB: Neodymium-Iron-Boron — alloy for permanent magnets

SmCo: Samarium-Cobalt — high-temperature magnets

SX: Solvent Extraction — main separation technology

CFEM: Financial Compensation for Mineral Resource Exploitation

ANM: National Mining Agency

MME: Ministry of Mines and Energy

BNDES: National Bank for Economic and Social Development

Finep: Financier of Studies and Projects

ENTR: National Rare Earth Strategy

PNM 2050: National Mining Policy 2050

DFC: U.S. International Development Finance Corporation

DoD: U.S. Department of Defense

IRA: Inflation Reduction Act (United States)

CRMA: Critical Raw Materials Act (European Union)

JORC: Joint Ore Reserves Committee (Australian reserve code)

NI 43-101: Canadian standards code for mineral projects

CAPEX: Capital Expenditure

OPEX: Operating Expenditure

NPV: Net Present Value

IRR: Internal Rate of Return

tpa: Tonnes per annum

Legal Notice

This document is a market intelligence study based on publicly available information and official sources. It does not constitute investment advice, a recommendation to invest, legal or financial advice, or any guarantee of investment returns. The information presented reflects the best available data identified at the time of research, with a reference date of August 2026. Projections, estimates, scenarios and forward-looking statements are based on stated assumptions and are subject to market, regulatory, technological, economic and other uncertainties. Investors and companies should conduct their own independent legal, financial, technical and commercial due diligence before making investment or business decisions.

Trust Brazil — Connecting International Companies with Brazilian Opportunities

• Trust Brazil serves as a bridge between international companies, investors and strategic opportunities in Brazil.

• Our role is to help international companies understand the Brazilian market, identify relevant opportunities and connect with qualified local businesses, projects, partners and institutions.

• Through market intelligence, business verification, partner identification, commercial matchmaking, local representation and market-entry support, Trust Brazil helps international companies move from market intelligence to local connections and business opportunities.

• For companies evaluating Brazil's rare earths and critical minerals sector, Trust Brazil can support the identification of relevant projects, companies, technology providers, industrial partners, investors and other participants in the Brazilian ecosystem.

Trust Brazil — Connecting International Business with Opportunities in Brazil